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sional enactment under the commerce clause was deemed valid although its
effect was to abrogate a previously consented to compact between Virginia
and Kentucky. Therefore, even if Congress could not technically withdraw
its consent to a compact under the compact clause, it would seem that it
could so regulate the external operations of any instrumentality created to
execute the compact that the effect would be to annul the compact. If then
Congress has the right through the interstate commerce clause to legislate
in an area concerning the Port Authority, it has the power to investigate,
to this extent.2 9 The investigation may extend to any matter pertinent to
the question under inquiry. 30 Here, again, the problem is presented of
balancing Congress' right to regulate interstate commerce and those rights
reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.
In the present case, the circuit court avoided the important constitutional issue involved, but noted the "gravity of passing upon even only one
of the constitutional questions posed by this case." However, it would seem
that the issue will be soon decided. The role of interstate compacts is now
much different than it was when the earliest decisions regarding interstate
compacts were decided. In cases involving boundary disputes, 3' it is not
hard to see why the Court was willing to imply that consent was irrevocable. In the case of an Authority whose operations could conflict with
other Congressional powers, it would seem that some other standard must
be found by the courts.
Nicholas C-. Bozzi
James M. Salony
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Essex Universal Corporation v. Yates (2d Cir. 1962)
The defendant, Herbert J. Yates, a California resident, was president
and chairman of the l oard of directors of Republic Pictures Corporation,
a New York corporation having at the time relevant to this suit, 2,004,190
shares of common stock outstanding. In August of 1957, negotiations began
between Yates and Joseph Harris, the president of Essex Universal Corporation (plaintiff), for the purchase of stock in Republic. A contract was
signed whereby Yates agreed "to sell or cause to be sold" at least 500,000
declared the bridge to be a lawful structure. In holding the legislation valid the
Court said: "Otherwise Congress and two states would possess the power to modify
and alter the Constitution itself."
29. See supra note 15.
30. See supra note 20.
31. Poole v. Fleegar, supra note 5; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, supra note 6.
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and not more than 600,000 shares of Republic stock. The price was set at
eight dollars a share, two dollars above the current market price on the
New York Stock Exchange. Three dollars per share was to be paid at
the closing and the remainder in twenty-four equal monthly installments.
All the shares were to be transferred on the closing date but Yates was to
retain the certificates endorsed in blank by Essex as security for full payment. In addition to other provisions, the following paragraphs were
contained in the contract:
6. Resignations
Upon and as a condition to the closing of this transaction if requested
by Buyer at least ten (10) days prior to the date of the closing:
(a) Seller will deliver to Buyer the resignations of the majority
of the directors of Republic.
(b) Seller will cause a special meeting of the board of directors
of Republic to be held, legally convened, pursuant to law and the
by-laws of Republic, and simultaneously with the acceptance of the
directors' resignations set forth in paragraph 6 (a) immediately preceding will cause nominees of Buyer to be elected directors of Republic
in place of the resigned directors.
Before the date of closing, Yates notified Harris that he would deliver
566,223 shares, or 28.3 per cent, of the Republic stock then outstanding.
Harris then formally requested Yates to arrange for the replacement of a
majority of the Republic directors with Essex nominees pursuant to paragraph 6 of the contract. This was to be accomplished by having eight of
the fourteen directors resign seriatim, being in turn replaced by an Essex
nominee who would be elected by the others as was provided in the corporate by-laws. But, when Harris tendered the full amount, Yates refused
to close the deal. Essex began an action in the New York Supreme Court
which was removed to the federal district court on diversity grounds.
That court granted summary judgment in favor of Yates, on the ground
that the provision in the contract providing for the immediate transfer of
control of the board of directors was illegal per se. On appeal, the appellate
court reversed, holding that a contract provision for the immediate transfer
of control of a corporation, coupled with the sale of stock representing a
voting majority, was not invalid as a matter of law. Essex Universal Corp.
v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
It is well settled that corporation stock is personal property.' Like
any other property, it can be sold, mortgaged, pledged, and taxed. 2 The
1. Hawley v. City of Malden, 232 U.S. 1, 34 S. Ct. 201 (1914) ; Hall & Farley v.
Alabama Terminal and Improvement Co., 173 Ala. 398, 56 So. 235 (1911) ; Banker's
Trust Co. v. McCloy, 109 Ark. 160, 159 S.W. 705 (1913); Kirkland v. Levin, 63
Cal. App. 589, 219 Pac. 455 (1923) ; Talcott v. Mastin, 20 Colo. App. 488, 79 Pac.
973 (1905); Colt v. Ives, 31 Conn. 25 (1862); Bryan v. Bullock, 84 Fla. 179, 93
So. 182 (1922) ; Hightenier v. Ansley, 126 Ga. 8, 54 S.E. 939 (1906); Herbert v.
Simson, 220 Mass. 480, 108 N.E. 65 (1915); Morris v. Hussong Dyeing Mach. Co.,
81 N.J. Eq. 256, 86 Atl. 1026 (1913) ; In re Jones, 172 N.Y. 575, 65 N.E. 570 (1902)
Appeal of Callery, 272 Pa. 255, 116 Atd. 222 (1922).
2. 11 FLETCHER CYC. CORP., § 5096 (1958).
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fact that a shareholder owns a majority number of the shares in a corporation generally does not affect his right to sell at any time and for any
price.3 It should be remembered that a shareholder retains this right even
though he may also be a corporate director or officer. 4 The sale of a
corporate office alone by the holder of that office, 5 or another officer, or
any agreement by an officer to use his influence to procure an office or to
retain an office for a third party is void as contrary to public policy.6 This
same control, however, can be passed legally by the transfer of controlling
shares.
Although great latitude is and must be given a shareholder in the
disposition of his stock, 7 a majority shareholder is in a more difficult position than one holding only a few shares. Because the sale of a majority
or a controlling bloc of shares results in the transfer of control of the corporation, a fiduciary duty has been imposed upon the seller,8 a breach of
which will result in liability for damages and for any profit received.9 Most
cases imposing such liability are so-called "looting" cases. For example,
in Gerdes v. Reynolds, 10 defendants were officers and directors of the company and together owned a majority of the common stock. Upon selling
their shares, the defendants resigned their positions and elected in their
stead designees of the purchaser. Thereafter, the assets of the corporation
were wasted and an action was brought against the defendant sellers. The
court laid down the rule that,
• . . officers and directors of a corporation, and under some circumstances and for some purposes the majority stockholders, whether one
or many, stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and to the
minority stockholders, and must observe the high standards of diligence, good faith, and loyalty required of all fiduciaries."
The defendants were found to have violated their fiduciary duty by not
having conducted a proper investigation of the motives of the purchasers.
Such an investigation would have revealed that the sole purpose of the
3. Tyron v. Smith, 191 Ore. 172, 229 P.2d 251 (1951); Roosevelt v. Hamblin,
199 Mass. 127, 85 N.E. 98 (1908) ; Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div.
208, 38 N.Y.S. 2d 517 (1942).
4. 3 FLETCHER CYC. CORP., § 900 (1958).
5. Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91 Atl. 428 (1914) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 203,
comment a (1935) ; Comment, 70 HARV. L. Rnv. 986, 992 (1956).
6. West v. Camden, 135 U.S. 507, 10 S.Ct. 838 (1890) ; Mansfield v. Lang, 293
Mass. 386, 200 N.E. 110 (1936) ; Sutz v. Michel, 148 Minn. 80, 181 N.W. 102
(1921) ; Kountze v. Flannigan, 64 Hun. 635, 19 N.Y. Supp. 33 (1892) ; In re Allied
Fruit and Extract Co. Inc., 243 App. Div. 52, 276 N.Y. Supp. 153 (1934) ; Ballantine
v. Ferretti, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 668, 678-680 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Cf. Annot., 12 A.L.R. 1060
(1921).
7. See Searles v. Bar Harbor Banking and Trust Company, 128 Me. 34, 145 Atl.
391 (1929). For an exhaustive survey of the law regarding the restrictive sale of
corporate stock, cf., Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1154 (1929).
8. Levy v. American Beverage Corp., supra note 3 at 216, 38 N.Y.S. 2d at 525;
HENN, CORPORATIONS § 242 (1961).
9. HENN, op. cit. supra note 8; 3 FLETCHR CYc. CORP., § 900, pp. 307-08.
10. 28 N.Y.S. 2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
at 650.University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963
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purchase was to gain control of the corporate assets. The defendants were
12
held accountable for the resulting damages.
In addition to the award of consequential damages, any profit that
can be distinguished above the market value of the stock sold is given to
the corporation to be distributed among the minority shareholders, placed
in the corporate treasury or deposited in trust for the minority shareholders." The reason generally propounded for this action is that a sale
of power or office, absent a sale of stock, is the sale of a "corporate asset"
belonging only to the corporation and not to the individual officers or
shareholders. This so-called "corporate asset" theory was formally advanced by Berle and Means in 1932.14 They believed that premiums paid
for a controlling interest were for power and not for stock; since the
former was corporate property, any premium or profit exacted therefrom
belonged to the corporation. Evidence of such a theory can be traced to
Bosworth v. Allen," decided in 1901. The defendants, officers and directors
of a corporation, conspired with several purchasers to transfer the control
of the corporation and its assets to the latter and to sell their capital stock
in the corporation. The sale price exceeded the withdrawal value of the
stock by $1,168.53. When the purchasers proceeded to mismanage the
corporation and waste its assets, the court held the defendants in violation
of their trust and assessed damages. In dealing with the $1,168.53, the
court said:
The amount

.

. . paid to them for official action, was money obtained

pursuant to the same conspiracy by virtue of their office as directors,
for which they must account as part of the assets of the corporation
• . . and the law, in order to protect the corporation, treats it as its
property, and, therefore money which it is entitled to recover from all
the defendants. 6
However, in cases where there has been no fraud, bad faith or injury
to the corporation, a profit above the market price has been held the property of the seller and his rightful yield from the increased value of the
17
stock as a controlling bloc.
12. See also Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp. Ltd., 35 F. Supp. 22
(E.D. Pa. 1940); Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., 208 S.W. 2d 344 (Tenn. 1948),
where the court held the defendant liable for the misappropriation of corporate assets.
13. Gerdes v. Reynolds, supra note 10. See also Heinman v. Marshall, 117 Mo.
546, 92 S.W. 1131 (1906), where a premium exacted for the sale of a corporate
office, itself, was awarded to the association. Accord, Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427, 91
Atl. 428 (Pa. 1914), 3 FLETCHER CYc. CORP. § 900 at p. 307 (1958) ; HENN, op. cit.
supra note 8 at 385; Perleman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 952, 75 S. Ct. 880 (1955) ; Stanton v. Hample, 272 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1921),
where the award included the excess received from the sale of the shares.
14. BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 244
(1932).
15. 168 N.Y. 157, 61 N.E. 163 (1901).
16. Id. at 167, 61 N.E. at 165. For a more recent case dealing with this issue,
see Perleman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952,
75 S.Ct. 880 (1955).
17. Stanton v. Schenk, 140 Misc. 621, 251 N.Y. Supp. 221 (1931) ; Roosevelt
v. Hamblin, 199 Mass. 127, 85 N.E. 98 (1908) ; Roby v. Dunnett, 88 F.2d 68 (10th
Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 706, 57 S. Ct. 940 (1937) ; Benson v. Braun, 155
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An acceleration clause such as the one in the Essex case was upheld
as early as 1880 when Judge Earl, in Barnes v. Brown,18 found in favor
of the seller:
There is no proof that in obtaining the resignation of the plaintiff and
other directors, and in filling the vacancies, any fraud or wrong was
intended upon the corporation or any of its stockholders, or that any
of the stockholders at any time objected to what was done in this
respect. It was simply the mode of transferring the control of the
corporation to those who by the policy of the law ought to have it,
and I am unable to see how any policy of the law was violated, or
in what way, upon the evidence, any wrong was thereby done to
anyone. 19
This case can be distinguished, however, on the basis that the sale was for
over fifty per cent of the stock outstanding. In San Remo Copper Mining
Co. v. Moneuse,20 a similar stipulation was upheld, but the stock involved
was sufficient to give absolute control. Although like provisions have appeared in many cases, fraud or looting was also usually involved, and the
courts have preferred to rest their decisions on these grounds rather than
determining the validity of the acceleration clause.2 1 In short, it would seem
that the presence or absence of fraud, bad faith, etc. has been the determining factor in cases where controlling shares were sold at a premium.
The court in Essex has taken a firm stand in this area where only a
paucity of cases are to be found. It has established that the purchaser of
a majority voting bloc, which is, however, only a minority of the shares
outstanding, can, by virtue of his purchase, take immediate control of the
corporation. Further, a separate stipulation to this effect in the contract
of sale is neither invalid per se nor necessarily contrary to public policy.
It is interesting to compare the Essex case with Insuranshares Corp. v.
Northern Fiscal Corp.,22 where a minority of outstanding shares was trans-

ferred which, like Essex, represented a voting majority. The initial step
of the sale was to have the incumbent directors resign seriatim to be
replaced by nominees of the purchaser. The court in this case found the
transfer of control to be the primary purpose of the sale and the transfer
of stock merely secondary. But here, again, the purchasers were looters,
and the sellers had constructive knowledge of this from the price received
for the stock the amount paid was over two hundred per cent of the market
price and almost one hundred per cent above book value). The court
reached a result opposite to that in Essex.
N.Y.S. 2d 622 (1956), where the court indicated in dicta that a different result would
have been reached had fraud been found or had the evidence revealed that the
defendants should have foreseen looting.
18. 80 N.Y. (11 Hun.) 527 (1880).
19. Id. at 537.
20. 149 App. Div. 26, 133 N.Y. Supp. 509 (1912).

21. Perlenian v. Feldmian, supra note 16; Ballantine v. Ferretti, 28 N.Y.S. 2d
668 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
22. Supra note 12.
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Chief Justice Lumbard, in writing the opinion in Essex, concluded
that the contract for the sale of stock and the provision for the resignations
were inseparable, that the latter was incident to the former and that the
Essex corporation was acquiring a voting majority of the shares. He found
no indication of fraud, bad faith, or illegality in the making of the contract
nor that there would be any looting of the corporation or its assets..2 3 He
reasoned that Essex had the power to control, that this power could be
exercised immediately, and, therefore, the clause providing for this exercise
24
was also valid.
Many courts have reasoned that since one similar to the present purchaser would exercise his control powers at the first election, the acceleration is merely an acceptance of the inevitable. However, Judge Friendly,
concurring in the instant case, viewed a mass seriatim resignation of a
board of directors as a violation of the trust placed in them by their
electors. A full majority of the board was replaced without regard to the
shareholder. He suggested not that Essex should be denied its right to
control, but that it should assume this control only after a special election
pursuant to the purchase (unless such election would be "mere formality
i.e.: when the seller owned more than fifty per cent of the stock").
There is little difficulty either when the sale involves more than fifty
per cent of the outstanding stock or when it concerns a small number of
shares lacking voting control. There is only a problem when a substantial
minority is sold which purportedly gives the purchaser a voting control.
Depending on the size and ownership of the corporation, this could range
anywhere from about fifteen per cent to as high as forty nine percent. In
electing directors, shareholders must expect that certain of those elected
will resign and be replaced by the remainder of the board. But, when the
resignations involve eight of fourteen directors and control passes into the
hands of a stranger, the shareholder's vote has been nullified. Of course,
in the transfer of absolute control, the shareholder has no recourse; and,
in the case of a substantial minority, any recourse will probably be of little
avail. For even if the shareholders could unite to oust the purchaser at
the next election, in cases where this would be necessary, it would probably
already be too late. On the other hand, from the purchaser's point of view,
the seriatim resignation eliminates the cost of soliciting proxies in the
event of a special election. Further, an open election might arouse the
desire of a third group to gain control, thus throwing open the doors for
a costly and often bitter proxy fight which the purchaser would probably
have small chance of losing anyhow. A special election would avoid this
situation and would also serve to acquaint the shareholder with the new
23. This factor Justice Lumbard used to distinguish this case from all the preceding cases which had reached the opposite conclusion.

24. "Given this principle that it is permissible for a seller thus to choose to
facilitate immediate transfer of management control, I can see no objection to a

contractual provision requiring him to do so as a condition of the sale."
572, 577 (2d Cir. 1962).

Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss2/6
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control group and give him an opportunity, by his vote, to prevent possible
harm where he otherwise would be unable to do so.
Allowing immediate transfer would also give the purchaser an opportunity to acquaint himself with his new job and enable him to continue
and advance the corporation immediately. Further, it can be readily understood that the directors of the corporation who represent the seller, knowing that their principal has relinquished his interest and that their terms
will definitely end at the next election, might tend to grow lax in corporate
matters. It would be difficult to conscientiously advance the interests of
an employer, realizing that the benefits will be shared by others only.
Optimistically, the buyer's directors would take office with interest and
enthusiasm.
These problems can be resolved, of course, by insuring the good faith
of the purchaser before the sale. While the Essex case may have removed
the first obstacle blocking a procedure which could advance and profit a
corporation, it has failed to provide the necessary checks to insure a
legitimate transfer of control without fraud, conspiracy, or looting.
Perhaps requiring the prospective seller of a controlling bloc to submit his proposal of sale to a special investigating committee of the corporation would aid in preventing a bad faith purchaser from steadily attaining a position in which he could cause extensive damage. Such a procedure would benefit the corporation, yet not impinge on the right of a
stockholder to sell when and to whom he pleases. Further, it would both
protect the corporation in cases of a sale of absolute control and save the
purchaser of a substantial minority, whose voting control would be almost
certain to prevail, from incurring the costs of a special election. However,
where the minority shareholder's power is doubtful, a special election
should be held. Unfortunately, the practical application of such an investigating committee is questionable. It is highly possible that a large shareholder could easily control such a measure.
Alternatively, an efficient means of notice to the minority shareholders prior to the sale may provide an answer. Since a minority shareholder's most effective weapon against a contemplated sale of control which
the shareholder deems invalid is a restraining injunction, a means should
be available whereby minority shareholders would receive notice and certain disclosures to enable them to voice their objections effectively. How
should such a publication be made and how much need be revealed? Would
the possibility of forcing the majority shareholder into litigation before he
is able to sell be too great a restraint on his freedom to dispose of his
property? Similar problems will arise regardless of the means of prevention or investigation, but the necessity for some protective methods
remains. With proper checking available, immediate transfer of control
can be executed, as indeed it should in situations like Essex, and the best
interests of the corporation will be protected.
Albert P. Massey, Jr.
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963
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FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-VETERANS HOSPITAL CONSIDERED
CHARITABLE

INSTITUTION AND IMMUNE FROM

LIABILITY.

White v. United States (E.D. Va. 1962).
Plaintiff, administrator of decedent's estate, commenced an action
against the United States in a federal district court under the Federal
Tort Claims Act.' The complaint alleged negligent treatment of the deceased by the defendant's employees who was, at the tine of his death, a
patient in a United States mental institution. The evidence showed that
the patients at the institution had been classified into three groups with
respect to their liberty of movement: some were completely confined, others
semi-restricted, and the remainder completely unrestricted. Just prior to
his death, the deceased had been transferred from the partial to the unrestricted category and was thus allowed to come and go as he pleased.
Shortly thereafter, his dead body was found crushed by a railroad train
near the hospital grounds. 2 At the trial, one of the hospital doctors testified that on the morning of the occurrence the deceased had complained of
nervousness and apprehension and that, although he had administered a
tranquilizing drug to the decedent, the doctor had not thought that the
situation warranted putting the patient on observational status. The plaintiff
contended that the decision to reclassify the deceased was a violation of the
hospital's duty to provide proper care for his safety. The defendant denied
its employees' negligence and pleaded affirmatively that its actions were
protected by charitable immunity and also that the decision was a discretionary one, exempt by a special provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act.'
The district court held that in an action against a federal hospital under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, the defense of charitable immunity was valid
and that, under the assumed facts, the alleged acts of negligence involved
discretionary decisions which were precluded from compensation under the
Act. White v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Va. 1962).
At common law, the King could do no wrong. This theory, incorporated into our jurisprudence as sovereign immunity, presented an adamant
bulwark against the claims of individuals for redress of injuries inflicted
on them by the government. Some relief was granted through the passing
of private bills by Congress but this process was too cumbersome and often
extremely unjust. In 1946, the Congress of the United States adopted the
Federal Tort Claims Act which waived the immunity traditionally afforded
1. 60 Stat. 842 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).

2. It is not clear whether the death occurred on the hospital grounds or whether
it resulted from an accident or suicide. Deceased had exhibited suicidal tendencies
in the past and had been committed to a mental institution on three separate
occasions.
3. 60 Stat. 842 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1958): "The provisions of this
chapter and § 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-- Any claim . . . based upon
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of . . . an employee of the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused."
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss2/6
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4
the federal government and rendered it liable as if it were a private person.
The Act contains certain exceptions which are specifically set forth but, in
the absence of such an express provision, there has been a tendency on the
part of many courts to read the waiver of immunity liberally. In considering this question,5 the United States Supreme Court has displayed a preference for Judge Cardozo's statement in Anderson v. John Hayes Construc-

tion Co. :"

the exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough
where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by
refinement of construction where consent has been announced.
...

In Indian Towing Co. v. United States,7 the Supreme Court of the United
States again gave force to the Cardozo interpretation by rejecting the
government's contention that the legislative intent was that the federal
government should not be visited with liability for actions that had no
"private person" counterpart. The case arose on a claim for damages
resulting when a barge was destroyed because of the failure of defendant's
employees to properly maintain a lighthouse which had been established
on the Mississippi River. The Court held that the government had not
been obliged to undertake the maintenance of the lighthouse, but once it
decided to act it had a duty to keep the light in working order.
Although the defendant failed to argue the defense of charitable immunity, the district court considered the point and concluded that the
Veterans Administration hospital qualified as a charitable institution under
Virginia law and was therefore immune from liability save for the negligent
selection of its employees." This finding is contrary to the decisions of
other federal courts that have considered the issue and have held that the
immunity afforded charitable institutions cannot be claimed by the federal
government when it performs comparable acts. The decisions appear to
rest on two distinct bases. The first line of authority is illustrated by the
case of Grigalaukas v. United States,9 which was an action to recover
damages resulting from the negligent treatment of an enlisted man's
daughter by an Army doctor in an Army hospital in Kansas. Since the
action was brought in a federal district court in Massachusetts, the court
4. 60 Stat. 842 (1946), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958) : "Subject to the provisions
of chapter 171 of this title the district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of civil actions on claims against the United States . . . for . . . personal injury
or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the

claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
5. United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383, 70 S. Ct.
207, 216 (1949).
6. 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29-30 (1926).
7. 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122 (1955).
8. Cf. Weston's Adm'rx. v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107
S.E. 785 (1921); Walker v. Memorial Hospital, 187 Va. 5, 45 S.E.2d 898 (1948)
Memorial Hospital v. Oakes, 200 Va. 878, 108 S.E.2d 388 (1959).
9. 103 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1951), aff'd 195 F.2d 494 (lst Cir. 1952).
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applied the law of Kansas 10 which granted to hospitals charitable immunity
from liability for the torts of their employees. After discussing the characteristics of charitable institutions and the valid reasons for making them
immune from liability, the court stated that the Army hospital derived its
funds not from charity but from public monies. While it did not receive
a monetary profit, as such, the court reasoned that a benefit did inure to
the government by reason of the favorable light cast on the armed forces by
such a service. Further, the existence of such medical care was found to
be an important factor in inducing military enlistments. The court concluded that no one who receives treatment in an Army hospital is the
recipient of charity. It is interesting to note that there is dictum in this
case that indicates that if Judge McCarthy had found that the Kansas
definition of a charitable institution applied to the Army hospital he would
have held the government immune from liability. Such a decision would
have had the effect of aligning that court with the court in the present case.
However, there is another line of cases which deny the defense of
charitable immunity. In the words of the court in Perucki v. United
States :11

The defendant contends that this case is analogous to those in which
a charitable institution is the defendant. The Pennsylvania decisions
consistently held that the rule of respondeat superior does not apply,
in the case of injuries occasioned by the negligence of agents or
servants of charitable institutions. The rationale which applies to
these decisions does not apply to the United States.
The rationale for this decision is more explicitly set forth by the court in
Tessier v. United States12 where the same contention was also advanced
by the government. That court declared:
This is a waiver of tort immunity. It would be illogical to read back
into the statute an immunity which has been granted to local charities,
presumably for the pragmatic purpose of extending the charitable
dollar to the greatest good of the greatest number, comparable in
many respects to ordinary governmental immunity.
The last cited case seems to be most consistent with the apparent
legislative intent of the Act. The government originally had a perfect immunity. Congress saw fit to alter that situation by making the government
liable to the same extent that a private individual would be under similar
circumstances according to the law of the place where the act or omission
10. This was done in accordance with the provisions of § 1346(b) quoted supra
note 4.
11. 76 F. Supp. 34, 35 (W.D. Pa. 1948). The district court in the present
decision, in discussing this case, stated that although a contrary opinion was reached
it was not authority for cases brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act since it
was decided prior to the adoption of the Act. A reference to the case, however,
discloses that it was brought under the provisions of the Act and was decided on
the precise point in issue.
12. 164 F. Supp. 779 (D. Mass. 1958).
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occurred. 13 It is understandable that the legislature did not want to
impose liability upon the federal government where a private person would
not be liable nor to a greater extent than that person. It is submitted,
therefore, that when a federal court looks to the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred it should do so in the light of ascertaining whether
a private individual would be liable under the circumstances and not
whether the actor whom the government most closely resembles would be
liable. Suppose, for example, "A", an employee of the federal government,
while working on a public works project, negligently drove a truck into
"B". Suppose, further, that "X", where the act occurred, provided redress
in such a circumstance where the actor was a private individual but had
not waived its sovereign immunity for torts committed by its agents. If
the court likens the federal government to the individual actor, liability
would be imposed. But if the court looks to see if the actor most resembling
the federal government would be liable, i.e., the state, it would find the
latter protected by sovereign immunity; hence, neither would the national
government be liable. Had the court in the instant case looked to the law
of the state to see if a private individual would be liable for negligence,
instead of trying to discover whether the actor that the federal government
most resembled would be liable (here, a charitable institution), the court
would have better given effect to the objective which the legislature had
sought to achieve.
The most troublesome of the explicit exceptions to liability under the
Federal Tort Claims Act is the one set forth in § 2680 (a) .1 4 Most of the
cases involving its construction have been concerned with the issue of where
the line should be drawn separating exempt discretionary functions from
those which are actionable because of the lack of discretion involved. Of
course, every voluntary action contains at least some degree of discretion.
But the legislators certainly did not wish to exempt every act resulting
from a choice of alternatives. On the other hand, the Federal Tort Claims
Act was not meant to be a device whereby the courts could review the
high level functions of the executive or the Congress, itself. Although a
precise test would be easier to apply, the courts, as yet, have unearthed no
adequate touchstone. 15 The cases treating with this point are in conflict.
To refuse treatment to a serviceman's wife, after assurance was given that
an Army ambulance had been dispatched, was held to be discretionary,' 6
while the decision not to install a handrail on a government post office was
not. 17 The decision to release a mental patient who stole a car and injured
13. Supra note 4; 28 U.S.C. § 2674: "The United States shall be liable . . . in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumnstances ...
"

14. Supra note 3.
15. For a collection of the cases dealing with the discretionary function cf.
.\nnot., 6 L. Ed. 2d 1422 (1962).
16. Denny v. United States, 171 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1948).

17. American Exchange Bank v. United States, 257 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1958).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963

11

